

"One-size-fits-all" or "Collusion"?— Current Chinese Local Government Policy Implementation Choices for Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection

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Abstract

In recent years, the Chinese central government has issued a series of energy conservation and environmental protection policies to promote China's ecological civilization construction. As the main executor of the central government's energy conservation and environmental protection policy, local governments in China should have implemented the policy as required. However, some local governments in China, regardless of the specific reality of the implementation object and policy environment, promote the implementation of the policy in a simple "One-size-fits-all" way, while other local governments selectively implement the central policy and resort to fraud in the face of inspections. Grassroots governments and local governments at higher levels are so tacitly "conspiring" that the ecological and environmental protection policies of the Chinese central government cannot be fully implemented and the policy effectiveness cannot be fully demonstrated. Why do China's local governments still have these situations in the process of policy implementation when the Chinese central government explicitly prohibits them? Why do local governments make a choice between "One-size-fits-all" and "collusion"? Taking the implementation of energy conservation and emission reduction policies and environmental protection policies in S city of China as an example, this paper puts forward the analysis framework of "local government execution resources-time" to analyze the behavior choice of local governments in China. This study finally found that under the common pressure of completing tasks and superior inspections, Chinese local governments will choose to adopt "One-size-fits-all" behavior or "collusion" behavior according to the matching degree of their own execution resources and time resources. The research in this paper helps to better understand the logic of Chinese local governments' choice of policy implementation methods, and also has certain reference significance for Chinese local governments' choice of policy implementation methods in other fields.

Keywords

Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection Policies; "One-size-fits-all" ; "Collusion" Behavior; Policy Implementation.

1. Introduction

In today's society, the construction of ecological civilization has become the foundation of national development and the cornerstone of the nation's future, and its importance is irreplaceable. In the face of the severe challenges of global climate change, energy conservation and emission reduction and environmental protection as the key measures to promote green and low-carbon development, its strategic position has become increasingly prominent. In this regard, the central government of China has issued a series of policy documents. The main content of these policy documents is to require local governments at all levels in China to take environmental protection, pollution reduction, carbon reduction, efficiency improvement, energy conservation and emission reduction as the starting point,

and effectively complete the task of ecological environment protection and energy conservation and emission reduction. However, in the process of local implementation at all levels, policies are often implemented in a "one-size-fits-all" or "collusion" manner.

The so-called "One-size-fits-all" refers to : the main body of policy implementation adopts a single and overly simplified method to implement policies ; this method often makes the scope of application of the policy improperly expanded, and ignores the synergistic effect in different situations, resulting in low efficiency or unsatisfactory results. The so-called "collusion" refers to : under the current governance system, local governments at all levels cooperate with each other to better adapt to and implement the policy requirements of their superiors ; this collaboration may include the selective implementation of certain policy content, or in the implementation of the search for flexible adaptation methods, in order to deal with the assessment and supervision of superiors, ' there is a policy, there are countermeasures ' is the best metaphor for collusion.

However, although the Chinese central government has repeatedly stressed that it is strictly prohibited for governments across China to adopt a "One-size-fits-all" or "collusion" approach in the implementation of energy conservation and environmental protection policies. However, in the actual implementation of energy-saving policies, local governments will still adopt a "One-size-fits-all" or "collusion" approach to implement the central government's energy-saving policies. Why is the policy implementation of "One-size-fits-all" or "collusion" repeated ? Is there any common cause of "One-size-fits-all" or "collusion" ? Why do some local governments choose "One-size-fits-all" and some local governments choose "collusion" ? These questions are worthy of careful study by the academic community. Answering these questions will help to better understand the operation logic and evolution process of bureaucratic organizations. This paper attempts to answer the above questions by analyzing the case of coal banning and electroplating industry transformation in S city, L province, China.

2. Literature review

It has become a common phenomenon in the practice of local governance that local governments adopt a "One-size-fits-all" policy implementation method in the process of policy implementation. This is not caused by the subjective behavior of local governing bureaucrats. There are complex mechanisms behind it. Starting from China's national governance structure, Zhou Xueguang proposed that "unified system and effective governance" are the profound contradictions of China's national governance. The core of "unified system" lies in the unity of policy deployment, [1] and the characteristics of unified decision-making power must be "One-size-fits-all" From the perspective of government implementation, in order to jump out of the pattern of conventional governance and improve their own governance capabilities, bureaucratic organizations such as the government often adopt a "One-size-fits-all" policy implementation method. Just as Liang Pinghan believes that "One-size-fits-all" is to "optimal sequential authorization in multi-level bureaucracy," [2] Shi Lei believes that "One-size-fits-all" is exploration of the path of grassroots law enforcement correction. "[3] So how does the advantage of "One-size-fits-all" come into being Liu Shengzhong, starting from the cultural roots, believes that "One-size-fits-all" is "distrust of impersonal management in culture" [4]. From the analysis of the main body of behavior, Zhang believes that local governments will decide whether to adopt a "One-size-fits-all" policy implementation method based on the signal strength they perceive. [5] ; zhuang Yuyi and Hu Rong analyzed the relationship between the resources available to local governments and the difficulty of task governance to analyze whether local governments choose to adopt a "One-size-fits-all" shutdown or centralized rectification[6].

In the process of policy implementation, it is also a normal state for local governments to adopt a 'conspiracy' approach to policy implementation. Ou Bowen and Li Lianjiang found that rural cadres "selectively implement" in the face of "soft" and "hard" policies when investigating rural cadres at the grass-roots level in China[7]. Rural cadres at the grass-roots level often ignore the 'soft' policies that are difficult to measure and put them on the shelf; and for those related to a clear numerical indicators, related to the promotion and must complete the 'hard' policy, they will go all out to implement. Ai Yun shows us the process of 'inspection' and 'response' between the upper and lower levels of government by examining the case of the year-end assessment of 'family planning' in a county. Under the supervision of the bureaucracy, the grass-roots government often adopts strategies such as "fraud," "reception," "escort" and "leapfrog help" to "cope with" the assessment and inspection of the superior[8]. Zhou Xueguang further proposed the concept of "collusion" to refer to the phenomenon that local superior and subordinate governments jointly respond to the common superior government in the implementation of various policy tasks[9]. On the basis of Zhou Xueguang, Ni Xing and Yang Jun put forward the concept of "vertical collusion." [10]. They believe that there is a vertical hidden interest alliance between local officials at all levels in the grass-roots government, which is linked by informal relations.

At present, the academic research on "one size fits all" and "collusion" has achieved the above important results, but there are still deficiencies. First of all, when explaining "One-size-fits-all" and "collusion," all the current studies are explained separately, and there is no framework that can combine the two and compare the analysis. Secondly, at present, when studying why local governments make "One-size-fits-all" or "collusion" behaviors, the academic community generally attaches importance to structural factors, including incentive intensity and bureaucratic pressure. Ignoring the important influencing factor of local government ability. In addition, most of the previous studies ignored the important influence of time.

The shortcomings of these previous studies are precisely what we need to further explore and study. Based on this, this paper will take the implementation of coal ban and electroplating industry transformation by S municipal government as an example, analyze the logic of local governments in the implementation of energy conservation policies and environmental protection policies, and choose the "One-size-fits-all" policy implementation method or the "collusion" policy implementation method.

3. Analysis framework : local government execution resources and time resources

Different scholars have different views on local government capacity. This paper argues that the essence of the so-called local government capacity is the ability of local governments to use the implementation resources they can mobilize to complete policies within a specified period of time. We must admit that the pressure and incentive intensity of bureaucracy have played a profound role in the shaping of local government 's policy implementation behavior, but the local government 's own implementation resources and the time pressure it faces fundamentally affect the local government 's choice. Therefore, to measure the size of local government capacity in specific affairs, it should be determined by comparing the matching degree between the amount of execution resources mastered by local governments and the specific time.

Local government execution resources refer to all the resources needed by local governments when implementing policies, including information resources, necessary financial resources and human resources needed for mobilization. Time refers to the time that the local

government can use to complete the policy requirements before the prescribed period of the policy and the inspection period of the superior supervision group.

We find that when local governments face this complex multi-policy implementation situation, they need to choose governance methods by classification (see Table 1). When time is abundant and local governments have sufficient resources for implementation, local governments often implement them out of the expectation of their own promotion and the need to make a good impression on leaders[18]. Downwards, they are responsible for taxpayers in their jurisdictions (Scenario 1). When faced with abundant time but insufficient resources for local governments to implement ; in the case of insufficient time and insufficient resources for local government implementation, local governments often choose "collusion" in order to cope with superior inspections and maintain their own promotion advantages (scenario 2, scenario 4). When faced with insufficient time but sufficient resources for local governments to implement, local governments will choose a "One-size-fits-all" policy implementation method. (See Table 1)

Table 1: Explanatory framework

		Local government execution resources	
		Abundant	Not Abundant
Time	Abundant	Scenario 1 : Implementation without compromise	Scenario 2 : Collusion
	Not Abundant	Scenario 3 : One-size-fits-all	Scenario 4 : Collusion

It can be seen that at present, local governments will choose to adopt "One-size-fits-all" or "collusion" by judging the matching degree of their own execution resources and time. Therefore, this study proposes :

Proposition 1 : In the current political environment, if local governments think that their own implementation resources are sufficient and time pressure is high, they tend to choose a "One-size-fits-all" policy implementation method.

Proposition 2 : In the current political environment, local governments tend to adopt "collusion" behavior to implement policies, regardless of time pressure, if they believe that their own implementation resources are insufficient.

This paper will take S city of L province as an example to explain the behavior logic of local government, and analyze the influence of local government 's execution resources and time matching degree on local behavior logic by examining the city 's coal ban activities and electroplating industry rectification cases.

4. Case : the implementation of energy conservation and environmental protection policy in S city

S city is an important industrial base in China, and the local rich coal resources are the basis for the development of S city. The abundant coal resources have led to the long-term dependence of S city on a single heavy industry, which makes S city face serious environmental pollution and excessive energy consumption per unit of GDP, and these problems are often the most serious in the winter heating period.

4.1. The process of "coal ban" in S city

In order to promote the construction of ecological civilization in China, since the end of 2016, the whole of China 's North China region has implemented the policy of " coal ban".

Let 's turn our attention to S city. In the winter clean heating policy in North China, the " coal ban" measures in S city occupy an important position. In the process of implementing the "coal ban "policy, the government is divided into two obvious stages. The first stage is from the beginning of 2017 to the beginning of December 2017, and the second stage is from mid-December 2017 to December 2018.

4.1.1 The first stage

In February 2017, S city was included in one of the ' 2 + 26 ' cities by the central government of China, and it was identified as the first batch of practical objects of the winter clean heating plan in the northern region. S city has received CNY 700 million of financial support from the Ministry of Finance. City S randomly promised to achieve the goal of coal ban in the urban area by the end of 2017, and to achieve clean heating for more than 70 % of the city 's residents in the following three years.

In April 2017, L province issued the " 2017 Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control, " which put forward clear requirements for the task of establishing a " coal-restricted area " in S city. For this reason, the first thermal power plant in S city stopped the operation of four 300 MW thermal power units. In May, the bulk coal treatment group of S city carried out a comprehensive campaign to tackle the key problems, and identified the construction task of " coal-banning area " as a key project affecting the improvement of environmental quality in S city, and implemented a strict " one-vote veto " system.

By September 21,2017, S city held a special ' iron wrist pollution control ' press conference, announced the implementation of the ' coal ban ' decision, the goal is to significantly reduce the use of coal in the winter heating period, improve air quality. In early November of the same year, the " coal to gas " project in S city provided clean energy for 290 villages and 121,000 households. In addition, the ' coal-to-electricity ' project also covered 13,000 households in 53 villages. In order to reduce the economic burden, the ' S City 's 2017 scattered coal management and winter clean heating implementation plan ' also provided subsidies to related enterprises and individuals involved.

With the establishment of the ' coal-restricted area ', the amount of heating coal in the urban area has been reduced by 2.04 million tons, and the emissions of soot, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides have been reduced by 60,000 tons, 23,000 tons, and 15,000 tons, respectively. Environmental monitoring data show that the average concentration of PM2.5 and sulfur dioxide in S city is expected to decrease by about 45 % year-on-year, and the number of heavy pollution days is expected to decrease by 40 %. Through these measures, S city has effectively improved the environmental quality and provided residents with cleaner air.

4.1.2 The Second stage

By the end of December 2017, many ten-point cities had successfully completed or even exceeded the tasks of " coal to gas " and " coal to electricity. " However, due to the rapid ' double reform ' process, there is a shortage of gas sources in winter, and not so much natural gas is used for heating. In response, China 's Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development issued an emergency notice in mid-December 2017, stating that the coal ban policy should be suspended in areas where gas sources are not fully guaranteed. The Chinese central government also reflected on the limitations of the initial policy, and then the central government also appropriately adjusted the coal ban policy, from the initial single energy substitution idea to a more flexible and diversified energy use strategy. A word is summarized as "electricity is electricity, gas is gas, coal is coal, heat is heat". In 2018, the central

government further clarified this adjustment direction.

However, the actual policy implementation of S city did not fully follow the central adjustment policy for rectification. First of all, S city still enforces the work of "coal to gas" and "coal to electricity" in some areas, and prohibits residents from burning coal for heating. According to the S city residents interviewed by us, due to the fact that the heater is issued according to the account book, some residents can not receive the heater at home, coupled with the high cost of heating electricity, these factors are superimposed, resulting in a considerable part of the S city residents. The way to heat the winter.

In view of this situation, we contacted the relevant personnel of the Environmental Protection Bureau of S City. In the face of our doubts, he answered: "The central policy adjustment is too fast, so we have no time to adapt, and the previous policy has spent a lot of manpower, material resources and financial resources of the S city government. If the direction is suddenly changed, the previous efforts will be in vain. And the repetition of policies will reduce people's trust in the government". Through his reply, we will find that S city has chosen a "one size fits all" approach to implement the coal ban policy under insufficient time resources.

4.2. Transformation of electroplating industry

The electroplating industry in S city has promoted the employment of local economic development. However, the operation of the electroplating plant is also accompanied by many problems, the two most prominent of which are the high energy consumption and high pollution of the electroplating plant. There are also two situations in the governance of electroplating plants in S city.

4.2.1 Conventional situation

For high energy consumption and high pollution enterprises, as early as 2006, the Chinese central government issued a policy of 'cutting production capacity for environmental protection'. In the past ten years, governments at all levels have introduced their own energy conservation and emission reduction policies. These policies require rectification of high energy consumption industries such as electroplating. Correspondingly, the electroplating industry in S city has also undergone two rounds of collective industrial upgrading. However, in the actual operation of the electroplating industry in S city, there is a phenomenon of coexistence of old and new production capacity. The root cause of this phenomenon is that the price of installing environmental protection equipment is too high, which makes it difficult for enterprises to bear.

At the same time, the personnel of the S City Merchants Bureau said to me: "Elimination of backward production capacity, environmental protection and energy conservation, are all money, but many electroplating plants have no money to replace environmental protection equipment. For those environmental protection indicators and energy-saving indicators that are not up to standard, the government can only pretend not to know for economic development and employment considerations." As of 2023, some electroplating plants in S city still use backward production equipment and production technology for production, while the governments of S city also turn a blind eye to this situation.

4.2.2 Check situation

From November 30 to December 27, 2021, the first ecological environment protection supervision group of L province carried out ecological environment protection supervision in S city. After the S municipal government got the wind in advance, it immediately asked the small electroplating plants (no new equipment was installed) to stop working. The large

electroplating plants that had upgraded their production capacity all adopted new processes for production, and all old equipment was shut down. When receiving the inspection team, S city government officials use informal networks and other relationships to cover up the electroplating industry as much as possible.

In 2022, some areas of S city have built environmental monitoring stations directly connected with the central ecological environment department. In order to cope with this situation, with the acquiescence of the S city government, the relevant district and county governments under the jurisdiction of the S city have sent people to indicate how the electroplating factory should operate and avoid monitoring. Many small electroplating factories start at night at the downwind. In large electroplating plants, new energy-saving equipment is used for production when the upper air outlet is in place. At night, the lower air outlet begins to be fully powered, and new and old equipment are used together.

5. "One-size-fits-all" or "Collusion": Local government 's choice logic

We now use the proposition mentioned above to explain why the S city government will move from uncompromising implementation to "One-size-fits-all" in the " coal ban " action, and why it will adopt " collusion " on the issue of electroplating industry transformation. When we put the two stages of the implementation of the ' coal ban ' policy in S city and the various situations of the transformation of electroplating plants in S city into the previous analysis framework, we will get the following table. (See Table 2) Next, we begin to analyze the selection logic one by one.

Table 2: The corresponding situation of S city

		Local government execution resources	
		Abundant	Not Abundant
Time	Abundant	The first stage of coal banning	Conventional situation of electroplating plant transformation
	Not Abundant	The second stage of coal banning	Check situation of electroplating plant transformation

5.1. Implementation without compromise

In the first stage of the "coal ban", the S city government adopted an unequivocal implementation strategy. This decision is based on several considerations : First, the S city government has enough time to implement the ' coal ban ' policy, because the S city government has developed a three-year detailed plan for this task, and for the first year should complete the task of a detailed description. And during this period, the central government did not modify the ' coal ban ' policy. These conditions give S city enough time to complete the task ; secondly, the S municipal government has sufficient implementation resources. In terms of funds, the S municipal government has received strong support from the central government of CNY 700 million in the process of implementing the ' coal ban ' policy. At the same time, S city set up a ' coal ban ' leading group, which was headed by the secretary of the municipal party committee and the mayor respectively. This measure has broken the original bureaucratic barriers, making the entire S city under high-level driving, and the mobilization capacity has been greatly enhanced ; because S city is ' forbidden coal ' to itself, this makes S city government can obtain more accurate information resources.

The abundant time and policy implementation resources of S city in the first stage of ' coal ban ' provide a solid foundation for it to unalterably promote the clean heating policy in winter. Through a series of ' coal ban ' measures, S city not only reached and exceeded the central set of ' coal to gas ' and ' coal to electricity ' task indicators at the end of 2017.

5.2. One-size-fits-all

When the time comes to the second stage of ' coal ban ', we will find that in the implementation of the ' coal ban ' policy, the S municipal government has not adjusted according to the central policy of ' electricity is electricity, gas is gas, coal is coal, heat is heat '. On the contrary, the S municipal government adopted a one-size-fits-all policy implementation method, and still strongly promoted " coal to gas " and " coal to electricity, " and implemented a comprehensive coal ban in the urban area, even if the masses were frozen. What is the logical choice that leads to this "One-size-fits-all" policy implementation phenomenon ?

First of all, from the perspective of the implementation resources of the S municipal government, in terms of financial resources, S city, as one of the first experimental cities of clean heating policy, has enjoyed special financial support from the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance will provide financial subsidies for three consecutive years to promote clean heating projects in S city. Therefore, S city has sufficient funds to implement the ' coal ban ' policy without worrying about funding. In terms of political resources, thanks to the direct participation and support of the standing committee of the provincial party committee and the municipal leaders of S city, the scattered coal management project of S city has been highly valued. Specific to the organizational structure, the leading group of scattered coal clean governance led by the standing committee of L provincial party committee and the secretary of S municipal party committee, as well as the deputy leader of the leading group held by the deputy secretary of S municipal party committee and the mayor, reflect the core position of the project in the policy implementation of S city. The project was included in the annual key assessment, and a strict ' one-vote veto ' system was adopted to ensure the responsibility and action of the S municipal government in the management of bulk coal. It can be said that it is precisely because the two top leaders of S city are personally in charge, S city has thus formed a high-level driving mechanism, which makes the political pressure of ' coal ban ' spread layer by layer from the leading group of scattered coal clean governance. Under such high-level drive and political pressure, the mobilization ability of S city has reached a new height. At the same time, the rich information resources mastered by S city have provided help for the "One-size-fits-all" implementation of the ' coal ban ' policy. To sum up, we find that S city has sufficient implementation resources. It is these implementation resources that lay a solid foundation for the "One-size-fits-all" implementation of the " coal ban " policy in S city.

Next, let 's look at the time resources faced by S city. At the beginning of December 2017, due to the insufficient supply of gas sources during the winter heating period of the year, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development had to issue an emergency notice in mid-December 2017, clearly requiring that ' coal burning shall not be prohibited for heating in areas where the gas source has not been implemented or the gas source of ' coal to gas ' is not in place. ' The central government also quickly realized the shortcomings of the original policy, quickly adjusted the guiding ideology, and transformed the guiding ideology into ' electricity is electricity, gas is gas, coal is coal, heat is heat '. However, it is these adjustments that make S city face the dilemma of time shortage, because if it is to be implemented in accordance with the requirements of the new policy of the central government and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, the effect is just as what the staff of the Environmental Protection

Bureau interviewed said. Not only that, if S city is implemented in accordance with the new policy of the central government, a large number of secondary problems may occur, such as : Can residents who have completed heating energy conversion return to coal-fired heating ? If it is decided to allow residents to choose to return to coal, then whether subsidies should be provided and how to determine the amount of subsidies. Considering that S city has made energy conservation and emission reduction commitments to the superior government, and the time is only more than one year. Therefore, based on the incentive of insufficient time and the full implementation resources of the S municipal government, the S municipal government adopted a "One-size-fits-all" policy implementation method to implement the new policy of the central government.

5.3. Collusion

In the implementation of energy conservation and emission reduction policies, S city should have carried out strict rectification of the ' high energy consumption and high pollution ' enterprises mentioned in the policy-electroplating plants. However, this is not the case. The S municipal government has adopted a ' conspiracy ' policy implementation method for the rectification of the electroplating plant. What is the logic of choice that leads S City to prefer to deal with inspections with anxiety rather than rectification, but to adopt this "collusion" type of policy implementation phenomenon ?

We still proceed from the perspective of the implementation resources owned by the S city government. First of all, in terms of financial resources, we find that although the S municipal government arranges 1 billion yuan of industrial transformation and upgrading and high-quality development funds in its policies, and 500 million yuan of new kinetic energy special funds to support energy-saving transformation in key industries such as coal, steel, coking, non-ferrous, building materials, and chemical industries. However, the funds actually implemented in the electroplating industry are still limited. According to the relevant personnel of the electroplating industry, the industry has received a total of about 10 million yuan of financial support, which is a drop in the bucket for the electroplating industry that is prone to start with tens of millions of renovation facilities. And the majority of these funds are taken away by large electroplating plants, and the financial support available to small electroplating plants is even less. This can also explain why some large electroplating plants have completed the iterative upgrading of some production capacity technologies, while small electroplating plants have almost none. Secondly, from the perspective of mobilizing resources, the rectification of the electroplating industry in S city did not establish a special working group and leading group as in the case of ' coal ban ', but let the departments responsible for the hierarchical system, such as the environmental protection bureaus of districts and counties, be responsible for rectification. This makes it difficult for the rectification of the electroplating factory to form a cross-regional, cross-sectoral joint force, and the mobilization ability is obviously insufficient. Moreover, compared with the relative transparency of residents ' information to the government, electroplating factory enterprises often conceal information for their own profits. This makes the information resources of S city government relatively insufficient.

From the perspective of time, we find that under normal circumstances, the S municipal government has a considerable amount of time to upgrade the electroplating industry, but the S municipal government has not actively reformed ; in the case of time-intensive inspections, the S municipal government has no time to carry out industrial upgrading. On the contrary, the S municipal government adopts a " collusion " policy implementation method to cope with inspections in partnership with the subordinate district and county governments.

Therefore, we find that when the S municipal government does not have enough

implementation resources to promote the rectification of the electroplating plant, then the S municipal government will choose the "collusion" policy implementation method regardless of whether the time is sufficient.

6. Summary

This paper compares the "One-size-fits-all" policy implementation and "collusion" behavior by examining the choice of policy implementation methods for energy conservation and environmental protection policies by the S municipal government of L province in China, and relies on the "local government execution resources--time resources" analysis framework. The causes and logic of these two types of behaviors were analyzed, which enriched the current research on "One-size-fits-all" and "collusion" behaviors. It provides a new perspective for understanding why "One-size-fits-all" and "collusion" behaviors are repeatedly prohibited.

Different from the previous studies that focus on the bureaucratic pressure and incentive intensity of local governments, this paper incorporates the implementation resources of local governments and the time resources of local governments into the consideration of local government policy implementation choices. Through the field interview survey of S city in L province, this paper finds that if the local government finds that the policy implementation resources are not sufficient, then no matter whether the time resources they face are abundant or not, the local government will choose the behavior of 'collusion' in order to cope with the inspection of the superior and maintain its own promotion advantage; if local governments find that time resources are not sufficient, but local governments implement sufficient resources, local governments will choose a "one size fits all" approach to policy implementation. Through in-depth analysis, this paper discusses the reasons and logic of local governments making specific policy choices under different conditions, reveals the internal mechanism behind these choices, and provides a new perspective for understanding the governance and operation mode of local governments.

The case study focuses on a prefecture-level city in central China. The choice of the city is influenced by its unique natural geographical conditions, social and cultural background, people's political consciousness, industrial structure and historical factors. Although these specific conditions provide profound insights into understanding the policy implementation of local governments, these findings may not be fully applicable to other regions or at the national level due to significant differences across China. Therefore, when extending the conclusions of this paper to a wider range, it needs to be carefully considered and appropriately adjusted. The specific applicability of to various places needs further consideration in the future.

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